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MOJICA v. RENO:* UPHOLDING DISTRICT
COURTS' STATUTORY HABEAS POWER
UNDER THE IMMIGRATION LAWS OF 1996
Colleen Caden**
INTRODUCTION
During the 1990's, American citizens experienced and witnessed
some of this country's worst incidents of terrorism on domestic
soil.' Responding to the public's outcry of fear and anger follow-
ing these tragedies, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act2 ("AEDPA") and the Illegal
" 970 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in part, dismissed in part,
question certified sub nom. Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998).
"* Brooklyn Law School Class of 1999; B.A., New York University, 1991;
M.A., New York University, 1993. The author wishes to thank her family for
their continued support, encouragement and inspiration. A special note of thanks
to Dyan Finguerra, Esq. for her enthusiasm and insights throughout the
preparation of this Comment.
Incidents of terrorism occurring within the borders of the United States
include: the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City that
killed six people and injured 1,042 people; the 1995 explosion of the Alfred D.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City that killed 168 people and injured
hundreds of others; and the explosion at Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta
during the 1996 summer games that killed one person and injured 111 others. See
Christopher John Farley, America's Bomb Culture, TIME, May 8, 1995, at 56;
Kevin Sack, Officials Show Bomb Parts in Atlanta, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997,
at 18; Jo Thomas, After Emotional Appeals, Bomb Jury Weighs Penalty, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1998, at 10. In addition, three people were killed and more than
twenty were injured by Ted Kaczynski's seventeen year reign of terror as the
"Unabomber." Reuters, Kaczynski Heads To Prison In Colorado, WASH. POST,
May 6, 1998, at A20. For a more in-depth look at this issue, see Symposium,
Domestic Terrorism. A Leadership Response, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 187
(1996).
2 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
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Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act3
("IIRIRA") to wage a war against domestic terrorism.4 This war,
however, has produced its own casualties: the curtailment of rights
enjoyed by lawful permanent residents5 and the Attorney General's
intrusion upon the judiciary's duty to "say what the law is."6
United States Attorney General Janet Reno 7 interprets the
AEDPA and the IIRIRA as eliminating the rights and privileges of
lawful permanent residents to seek judicial review of final orders
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
3 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No.
104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
4 In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the AEDPA and the IIRIRA into
law. The impetus behind the legislation was a concern for the "rights and needs
of crime victims and witnesses ... in the criminal justice system." Sara
Candioto, The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
Implications Arising From the Abolition of Judicial Review of Deportation
Orders, 23 J. LEGIS. 159, 160 n.6 (1997) (quoting Renewing Our Commitment
to Crime Victims, White House Memo for the Attorney General, Office of the
Press Secretary, June 28, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10346814).
5 An alien is defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") as any
person who is "not a citizen or national of the United States." Immigration and
Nationality Act § 101(a)(3), 66 Stat. 153 (1952) (codified as 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(3) (1985)). A lawful permanent resident is a specific alienage
classification which entitles individuals of foreign nationality to permanently
reside in the United States, without granting them citizenship. See Immigration
and Nationality Act § 101(a)(20) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1985)).
Some additional entitlements and requirements of lawful permanent residents
include the authorization to work indefinitely in the United States, to maintain
bank accounts, to serve in the armed forces and to pay taxes. Kiyoko Kamio
Knapp, Note, The Rhetoric of Exclusion: The Art of Drawing A Line Between
Aliens and Citizens, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 401, 401 (1996). In 1991, an
estimated 1.8 million foreign nationals obtained permanent residence. Id.
6 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who
apply the rule to a particular case, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must determine the
operation of each.").
7 On March 12, 1993 Janet Reno was sworn in as the 78th United States
Attorney General. Heather Mactavish, Profile: Janet Reno's Approach To
Criminal Justice, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 113, 113 (1993).
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of deportation 8 and barring federal courts from reviewing these
deportation decisions.9 The effect of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA
8 A deportable alien is one who is presently in the United States but who has
been deemed deportable by the INS. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (1998) (providing that
any alien in and admitted to the United States shall be removed by the Attorney
General if the alien: (1) violates any law of the United States, conditions of his
admission or violates his nonimmigrant or conditional permanent residence status;
(2) commits marriage fraud; (3) commits an aggravated felony or any other
criminal offense enumerated in this statute; (4) fails to register under the
provisions of the Alien Registration Act or commits document fraud; or (5)
engages in any activity that endangers the public's security).
An alien who is lawfully admitted into the United States after an inspection
and authorization by an immigration officer is considered a 'person' protected
by the United States Constitution. AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C.
BELL, IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE To LAW AND PRACTICE, § 7.1,
at 7-7 (4th ed. 1997). The individual found deportable is, therefore, entitled to
participate in a deportation proceeding to adjudicate his or her right to remain in
the United States. Id.
Lawful permanent residents' right to seek judicial review through habeas
corpus petitions began with the 1917 Immigration Act and gained strength
through a series of measures passed by Congress over the past fifty years. See
Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1953). In 1946, Congress adopted the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") which provided for judicial review of
administrative agency decisions, such as those rendered by an immigration judge
or the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), through declaratory judgment
actions. See Jorge v. Hart, No. 97 Civ. 1119, 1997 WL 53109, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 29, 1997). In 1952, Congress adopted the INA as the first federal statute
enacted to govern all aspects of immigration law. See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra,
§ 1.3, at 1-5. Immigration law governs the admission and expulsion of aliens. See
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545,
545 (1990). The Supreme Court interpreted the INA to permit judicial review in
district courts. See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 52 (1955). However,
in 1961 Congress amended the INA to streamline what it perceived to be a
deportation system plagued with successive review of deportation orders. See
Marcello v. District Dir., 634 F.2d 964, 968 (5th Cir. 1981). The new provisions
were intended to expedite deportation proceedings in the federal courts. Act of
September 26, 1961, § 5a, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650 (repealed 1996).
" See Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that
"[u]nder the government's reading [of AEDPA] legal permanent residents, many
with relatively minor convictions, would now be subject to automatic deporta-
tion"), aff'd in part, dismissed in part, question certified sub nom. Henderson v.
INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998).
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on lawful permanent residents is of historic proportion in that never
before have they been denied access to the federal courts.1 0
In Henderson, the Second Circuit affirmed Mojica's finding that federal
district courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to grant writs of habeas
corpus but the court narrowed the scope of that review. Henderson, 157 F.3d at
122. The Henderson court stated:
[W]e hold that federal courts have jurisdiction under section 2241 to
grant writs of habeas corpus to aliens . . . . This is not to say that
every statutory claim that an alien might raise is cognizable on habeas.
But those affecting the substantial rights of aliens of the sort that the
courts have secularly enforced-in the face of statutes seeking to limit
judicial jurisdiction to the fullest extent constitutionally
possible-surely are.
Id. Further, the Henderson court noted that the Attorney General's contention
that no court has the power to review her interpretation of the immigration laws
is incorrect:
[T]his position is, to put it mildly, not only at war with the historical
record described earlier in this opinion-for at least a hundred years,
the courts have reviewed the executive branch's interpretation of the
immigration laws, and have deemed such review to be constitutionally
mandated-it is also hard to square with the core conception of habeas
corpus as it has been applied over many centuries.
Id. at 120.
Included in the AEDPA and the IIRIRA are provisions that the government
now contends deny lawful permanent residents access to federal courts. Section
440(a) of the AEDPA states that any final order of deportation issued against an
alien who has committed a criminal offense "shall not be subject to review by
any court." Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 440(a) (1996).
IIRIRA's section 309(c) further eliminates judicial review of deportation by
providing that "there shall be no appeal permitted in the case of an alien who is
inadmissible or deportable by reason of having committed" one of the
enumerated crimes. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act § 309(c). Due to the integral relationship between the AEDPA and the
IIRIRA, the Mojica court analyzedboth statutes in determining its subject matter
jurisdiction. Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 158. Moreover, AEDPA section 440(a) and
IIRIRA section 309(c) contain nearly the same jurisdictional provisions and, thus,
both raise the same question presented in this Comment: whether these
amendments preclude habeas corpus review by a district court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.
0 LawfdFpermanent residents have always had the right to test the legality
of their deportation order before the federal judiciary. See Heikkila, 345 U.S. at
234 ("Now, as before, he [the alien] may attack a deportation order only by
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The court in Mojica v Reno, however, resoundingly dismissed
the Attorney General's statutory interpretation of the AEDPA and
the IIRIRA, thereby protecting the rights of lawful permanent
residents and restoring power to the judiciary. In Mojica v.
Reno," United States District Judge Jack B. Weinstein 2 held that
the AEDPA and the IIRIRA neither repeal district courts' habeas
corpus powers to hear deportation cases under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
nor do these statutes narrow the scope of section 2241.3 The
habeas corpus."). The Supreme Court's recognition of a lawful permanent
resident's right to due process stems from the Constitution and is further but-
tressed by the harsh consequences of deportation. See Kwong Hai Chew v.
Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598 (1953) ("[W]e interpret this regulation as making no
attempt to question a resident alien's constitutional right to due process."); Fong
Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) ("We resolve the doubts in favor of
that construction because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the
equivalent of banishment of exile."); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 162
(1945) ("No less may a statute on its face disregard the basic freedoms that the
Constitution guarantees to resident aliens."). Moreover,
[t]o deport one who so claims to be a citizen obviously deprives him
of liberty ... [i]t may result also in the loss of both property and life,
or of all that makes like worth living. Against the danger of such
deprivation without the sanction afforded by judicial proceedings, the
Fifth Amendment affords protection in its guarantee of due process of
law.
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
' Mojica, 970 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in part, dismissed in
part, question certified sub norn. Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998).
The Mojica court is the first in the country to hold that 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the
federal statute that grants district court judges the authority to hear writs of
habeas corpus, has not been narrowed in scope by the passage of the AEPDA
and the IIRIRA. Id. at 163. Yesil v. Reno was the first case in the country to hold
that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 has not been repealed by the AEDPA or the IIRIRA. 958
F. Supp. 828, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The Yesil court, however, never reached the
issue of section 2241's scope. Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 163.
2 Judge Weinstein was appointed United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York on April 15, 1967. SECOND CIRCUIT REDBOOK 376
(Vincent Alexandered., 1997). Weinstein was appointed Chief Judge in 1980 and
assumed senior status on March 1, 1993. Id.
" 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any
justice, thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their
174 JOURNAL OF LA W AND POLICY
Mojica court also suggested that lawful permanent residents be
granted the same substantive constitutional rights as American
citizens.' 4 At a time when the majority of federal courts are
interpreting the AEDPA and the IIRIRA as repealing in whole, 5
respective jurisdictions.
(c) The Writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-
(1) He is in custody under color or by color of the authority of the
United States or...;
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treatises
of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(1), (c)(3) (1994). The writ of habeas corpus stems from
the Constitution and is implemented through federal statutes. See RONALD P.
SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 30-38 (1969). It functions to test the legality
of restraints on a person's liberty. Id.
Habeas corpus has never been treated as a right limited to United States
citizens. Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the
Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 1046 (1998). In the immigration
context, habeas corpus has been used to challenge the constitutionality of
substantive immigration laws as well as the procedures utilized in enacting
statutes. Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to
Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1469
(1997). Habeas corpus, for example, has been used to review the INA's statutory
interpretation, to review the INA's use of discretion under statutes and to review
evidentiary challenges at administrative hearings. Id. Supreme Court precedents
dating back to 1787 have confirmed "the applicability of the writ of habeas
corpus to the detention involved in the physical removal of aliens from the
United States." Neuman, supra, at 1044. For example, in Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, the alien-petitioner was detained in San Francisco and not
permitted entry by customs officials. 142 U.S. 651, 656 (1892). The petitioner
filed a writ of habeas corpus and the court responded by holding that "[a]n alien
immigrant prevented from landing by any such officer claiming authority under
an act of Congress, and thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to
a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful." Id. at 660.
Further, in Jung Ah Lung v. United States, the Court upheld the power of the
district courts to review habeas corpus petitions filed by aliens deemed
excludable under the Chinese Exclusion Act. 124 U.S. 621 (1888). The Court
stated: "We see nothing in these acts which in any manner affects the courts of
the United States to issue writs of habeas corpus." Id. at 628-29.
"4 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 146-51.
'5 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Morgan v. McElroy, 981 F. Supp. 873
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or amending in part,'6 the power of district courts and the rights
of lawful permanent residents, the Mojica opinion, with its
"rigorous and detailed analysis,,'' 7 remains a watershed.' 8
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (concluding that section 2241 barred all avenues of judicial
review, including habeas corpus); Mayers v. Reno, 977 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D. Fla.
1997) (finding that Congress has "eliminated all avenues of judicial review of
criminal orders of deportation under habeas corpus"); Theck v. INS, No. C 96-
4668, 1997 WL 37565 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1997) (holding courts of appeals have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
6 Nearly all of the circuit courts to consider this issue have held that district
courts retain jurisdiction under section 2241; however, none of them hold, as did
the Mojica court, that section 2241's power remains unaffected by the AEDPA
and the IIRIRA. Rather, the circuits are split as to how narrow the scope of
section 2241 review is in the deportation context. See Magana-Pizano v. INS,
152 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that "to the extent habeas remedies
in immigration cases are protected by the Suspension Clause, relief is afforded
through the statutory remedy of 28 U.S.C. § 2241"); Gonclaves v. Reno, 144
F.3d 110, 123-25 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that "no express congressional intent
in the language of either the AEDPA or IIRIRA prevents an alien . . . from
seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241" but declining to define
the jurisdictional limits of the statute); Mansour v. INS, 123 F.3d 423, 426 (6th
Cir. 1997) (holding that habeas corpus review remains available under the
AEDPA, however, the court does not define its scope); Ramallo v. Reno, 114
F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that habeas corpus review remains
intact but not defining its scope); Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th
Cir. 1997) (stating that habeas corpus review exists for "substantial" constitution-
al errors); Williams v. INS, 114 F.3d 82, 83 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a
"limited opportunity" to apply for a writ of habeas corpus remains under the
AEDPA but declining to define the perimeters of such review); Yang v. INS,
109 F.3d 1185, 1196 (7th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging habeas corpus but limiting
its use based on the type of claim); Salaazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d
Cir. 1996) (holding that the AEDPA withdraws jurisdiction of the circuit courts,
but stating "we do not foreclose judicial review of all claims by aliens arising in
the course of deportation proceedings"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1842 (1997).
" Billett v. Reno, 2 F. Supp. 2d 368, 372 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating "[i]n
Mojica, Judge Weinstein employed a rigorous and detailed analysis of the issues
involved in determining whether or not the court had jurisdiction").
" Judge Weinstein found that statutory habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 is not limited to constitutional issues but may be used to challenge INA's
interpretations of statutes. Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 163. Only a handful of district
courts have adopted the Mojica holding that the scope of section 2241 has
remained unaffected by the AEDPA and the IIRIRA. See Lee v. Reno, 15 F.
Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 1998); Avelar-Cruz v. Reno, 6 F. Supp. 2d 744 (N.D. Ill.
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Although the Mojica decision discusses numerous issues of
great constitutional magnitude, this Comment focuses on two
issues: the court's subject matter jurisdiction under the federal
habeas statute and the court's discussion of awarding substantive
constitutional rights to lawful permanent residents.9 This
Comment argues that the Mojica court properly held that the 1996
immigration laws neither eliminate the district courts' habeas
1998); Billett v. Reno, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 372; Thompson v. Perryman, No. 98 C
1596, 1998 WL 473471 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 1998). Rather, most district courts
around the country have held that a limited avenue of judicial review exists in
federal courts for challenging final orders of deportation. See, e.g., Duldulao v.
Reno, 958 F. Supp. 476, 479 (D. Haw. 1997) ("This court is persuaded that the
scope of habeas corpus review has been limited after the passage of AEDPA, and
therefore the fundamental miscarriage of justice standard strikes the proper
balance between the role of habeas corpus and the Congress' plenary power in
immigration matters."); Yesil v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 828, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(declining to determine whether the scope of the district courts' habeas corpus
jurisdiction had been amended under the AEDPA, the court held that the
petitioner's case presented a fundamental miscarriage of justice and substantial
constitutional claims); Mybia v. INS, 930 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
("[T]he court finds that, with respect to aliens subject to orders of deportation for
having committed crimes enunciated by Congress, the Constitution requires only
that the writ of habeas corpus extend to those situations in which the petitioner's
deportation would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice."). Unlike
Mojica, these courts found that the scope of section 2241 is only available in
deportation situations where there exists the threat of "a fundamental miscarriage
of justice." A substantial constitutional claim or miscarriage of justice is
generally defined as one which is "cognizable under traditional habeas
proceedings such as allegations of constitutional due process or equal protection
violations." Galaviz-Medina v. Wooten, 27 F.3d 487, 492 (10th Cir. 1994).
" Before the court were two additional issues. The first issue was whether
the Attorney General could retroactively apply AEDPA section 440(d), which
expanded the number of crimes for which a criminal alien could be summarily
deported, to criminal aliens who were in deportation proceedings prior to the
enactment of AEDPA. See Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 168. The effect of retroactive
application is the elimination of a section 212(c) hearing for those who were
entitled to one prior to the enactment of AEDPA. Id. See infra note 47
(discussing section 212(c) hearings). For a closer look at the debate surrounding
the retroactive application of AEDPA section 440, see Candioto, supra note 4.
The second issue was whether the district court had the power to review an
administrative agency's interpretation of a statute. Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 180.
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powers under 28 U.S.C. § 224120 nor abridge the scope of the
district courts' power. Part I discusses the facts of Mojica v Reno
and its holding. Part II examines the Mojica court's analysis of
habeas corpus powers under section 2241. Part III analyzes the
viability of the Mojica court's vision for the future of immigration
law-a future in which lawful permanent residents are awarded
substantive constitutional rights. Finally, this Comment concludes
that although the Mojica court's statutory interpretation of the
AEDPA and the IIRIRA is wholly supported by Supreme Court
precedent, Congress is unlikely to accord any aliens substantive
constitutional rights in the current political climate.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF MOJICA v. RENO
Guillermo Mojica is a native and citizen of Colombia and has
been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for twenty-
five years.2' A resident of Queens, New York since his arrival in
June of 1972,22 he is married to a naturalized United States citizen
with whom he has two American citizen daughters.
2 3
In 1988, Mojica pled guilty to conspiring to distribute co-
caine, 24 served a one-year sentence and was released from
2' Habeas corpus has always been a due process right guaranteed to resident
aliens. SOKOL, supra note 13, at 57-59; see also Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (holding that an alien may challenge the legality of
an exclusion order by habeas corpus).
2 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 140. Mojica's case was consolidated with that of
Saul Navas, a 22-year-old citizen of Panama who has been a lawful permanent
resident since 1987. Id. at 138. The facts of the Navas case will not be reviewed
here because they raise the same questions of law as the Mojica case. See supra
note 8 (discussing the statutory definition of lawful permanent resident).
22 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 140.
23 Id.
24 Id. Mojica was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 846 which provides:
"Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this
subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed
the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which
was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1970). The
United States Code Annotated comment further states:
[U]nder 'common understanding and practices,' this section, by
reference, sufficiently apprises all persons of the illegality of any
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prison."5 He had never before been convicted of a crime.26 Four
years later, Mojica renewed his Alien Registration Card without
any inquiry by the government into his conviction or any mention
of deportation.2 7 In 1995, he applied for United States citizen-
ship.
28
On January 9, 1996, he and his wife flew into John F. Kennedy
Airport in New York from Ecuador where they had been on
vacation visiting family.29 Upon their arrival, Mojica was detained
overnight at the airport by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service 30 ("INS") and was told to report to their offices in
Manhattan on February 12, 1996.31 He was also ordered to bring
certified copies of his now eight-year-old criminal case disposi-
tion.32 Contemporaneously, the INS sent Mojica a notice that his
naturalization interview was scheduled for March 12, 1996. 33 On
February 12, 1996, Mojica and his lawyer went to the INS office,
whereupon the INS confiscated Mojica's passport and green
card.34 He was told by INS that they would contact him; however,
agreement to possess and distribute totally prohibited drugs such as
heroin and, thus, adequately informs the public of the criminal
potential of conduct proscribed and withstands constitutional scrutiny
under U.S.C.A. Constitutional Amendment 5.
21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 1970).




29 Id. at 141.
30 The Immigration and Nationality Act delegates jurisdiction over
immigration matters to the Attorney General who, in turn, has redelegated
responsibilities to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1103 (West 1998). The INS has basic authority to inspect aliens at the border,
admit them to the United States, and regulate their movement within the borders
of the United States. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357 (1970). Additional responsibilities
of the INS include: investigation, arrest and commencement of proceedings
against deportable aliens. See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 8, § 1.4, at 1-17
to 1-18.
3" Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 141.
32 Id.
33 Id.
31 Id. A green card is issued to lawful permanent residents as evidence of
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they did not return either piece of identification.35 On April 10,
1996, not having heard from the INS, Mojica's attorney sent a
letter to the INS asking to have Mojica's green card returned.36
No reply was received.37 On April 24, 1996, President Bill
Clinton signed the AEDPA into law.
8
On May 28, 1996, Mojica's attorney sent a second letter to the
INS requesting that proceedings against Mojica be expedited.39
The following morning, on his own initiative, Mojica went to the
INS offices to ask for his passport back.40 At approximately 4:30
p.m., the INS admitted Mojica into the United States as a lawful
permanent resident and then immediately arrested him.41 The
arrest warrant alleged that Mojica was "within the United States in
violation of the immigration law.",42 The INS charged him, by
retroactively applying the AEDPA's newly broadened criminal
their authorization to live and work in the United States. INS Issues First High-
Tech 'Green Cards,' IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE NEWS
RELEASE (Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Public Affairs,
Washington, D.C.), Apr. 21, 1998.
" Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 141.
36 Id.
37 Id.
31 Id. See also supra note 4 (discussing President Clinton's signing of
AEDPA).
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provisions,43 as deportable because of his eight-year-old drug
trafficking violation.44
Mojica was transported to Louisiana and held in custody for
more than five weeks before being brought before an immigration
judge on July 5, 1996."5 The case was adjourned until August 2,
1996, when Mojica conceded deportability and was found
"3 The AEDPA has broadened the definitions of criminal offenses for which
an alien can automatically be deported. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227 (West 1998). For
instance, prior to the AEDPA, an alien was deportable for committing a crime
of moral turpitude within five years of entry, where the sentence imposed was
one year or more. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(2)(A) (West 1996). Today, under the
AEDPA, an alien found guilty of a crime of moral turpitude can be automatically
deported if the potential sentence is a year or more. See generally 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (1996) (enumerating criminal offenses under the AEDPA). Additionally,
the category of aggravated felonies has been expanded. As one practitioner
illustrated:
The definition of aggravated felony has been broadly expanded. The
following is a sampling of some of the newly added crimes: fraud or
deceit where the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000 (formerly
$200,000), tax offenses under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 where revenue loss to
the government exceeds $10,000 (formerly $200,000) and a theft
offense including receipt of stolen property when the term of imprison-
ment is one year.
Michael D. Patrick, The Consequences of Criminal Behavior, N.Y.L.J., July 27,
1998, at 3. Another legal commentator stated:
In 1988, Congress first created the category of aggravated felony as a
means of singling out the worst criminals for special treatment...
over the years more and more crimes were added... the effect of this
is to render virtually all ... felonies as aggravated felonies, including
thefts and burglaries where the sentence imposed exceeds one year.
Kari Converse, Defending Immigrants in Peril, THE CHAMPION, Aug. 1997, at
10.
44 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 142. AEDPA section 440(d) broadened the
category of crimes for which an alien can be deported. Section 440(d), titled
"Classes of Excludable Aliens," provides: an alien "is deportable by reason of
having committed any criminal offense covered in section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B),
(C), or (D) or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both
predicate offers are covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(I)." See Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214
(1996). Prior to section 440(d)'s enactment, Mojica would not have been subject
to deportation for his drug trafficking conviction.
45 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 142.
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deportable.46 He applied for a discretionary waiver of deportation
pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act section 212(c). 47 The
immigration judge, however, found him to be ineligible for relief
because the AEDPA eliminated section 212(c) relief for aliens in
deportation proceedings who have been convicted of certain crimes,
including drug trafficking. 8 The immigration judge applied the
AEDPA retroactively, thereby finding Mojica ineligible for section
212(c) relief, even though he was in deportation proceedings for a
crime committed eight years before the passage of the AEDPA.49
On February 3, 1997, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
dismissed Mojica's appeal."
46 Id. See supra note 8 (defining deportability).
47 Id. Under the INA section 212(c), a legal permanent resident who lived
in the United States for seven consecutive years and was accused of any crime
triggering deportation could be assured that even if he or she pled guilty or was
convicted of a crime, he or she would be able to seek a section 212(c) waiver of
deportation. Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 137. A section 212(c) waiver allowed the
INS, at its discretion, to waive the exclusion of a lawfully admitted permanent
resident who was returning to the United States to a lawful unrelinquished
domicile of seven consecutive years. See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 8,
§ 7.1, at 7-3. Among the factors weighed by an immigration judge in this post-
conviction proceeding are: family ties within the United States, evidence of
hardship to the individual and family if the deportation was executed and
existence of ties to property or a business in the United States. See generally Lok
v. INS, 611 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1982); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir.
1976).
48 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 142. See also Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act § 440(d).
49 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 141.
'0 Id. On June 27, 1996, the BIA issued a decision in In re Soriano in which
it held that the AEDPA's bar to section 212(c) relief should not be applied to
aliens who had section 212(c) applications pending on or before April 24, 1996.
Int. Dec. 3289, 1996 WL 426888 (BIA June 27, 1996). On September 12, 1996,
the Attorney General vacatedthe BIA's decision in Soriano. Int. Dec. 3289, 1996
WL 426888 (AG Op. Feb. 21, 1997). On February 3, 1997, the BIA dismissed
Mojica's appeal. Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 142. Subsequently, on February 21,
1997, the Attorney General issued her opinion in Soriano holding that the
AEDPA section 440(d) had eliminated section 212(c) discretionary relief and,
further, that section 440(d) should be applied retroactively to all deportation
proceedings pending on April 24, 1996. Int. Dec. 3289, 1996 WL 426888 (AG
Op. Feb. 21, 1997). This ruling served as a validation of the immigration judge's
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On March 4, 1997, Mojica filed a habeas corpus petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2241"' in the Eastern District of New York challeng-
ing the Attorney General's denial of a discretionary section 212(c)
hearing.12 Mojica did not challenge the findings of his deportation
hearing;53 rather, he asserted the right to a section 212(c) hearing. 4
decision in Mojica.
" 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1984).
52 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 135. The role of the immigration judge is to
conduct deportation and exclusion hearings and render decisions on these matters.
See Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudica-
tion: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1300, 1300 (1986).
The BIA, consisting of five attorneys, reviews cases on appeal from the
immigration judges. Id. The BIA, created by the Attorney General, is an arm of
the Department of Justice. The Attorney General has the power to review BIA
decisions. Id. Her powers are codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357 (West 1998). Prior
to the enactment of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA, an alien could appeal the BIA's
decisions to the federal courts if he had exhausted all of his administrative
remedies and he was about to be deported. See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note
8, § 8.5, at 8-24.
" A deportation hearing is a civil administrative hearing, not a criminal
proceeding, held before an immigration judge. See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra
note 8, § 7.5. An immigration judge is authorized to administer oaths, receive
evidence, and interrogate, examine and cross-examine the alien and any
witnesses. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 8, § 7.1, at 7-5. The alien may be
represented by counsel, at his own expense, at this proceeding. FRAGOMEN &
BELL, supra note 8, § 7.1, at 7-5. Further, the alien has the right to examine the
evidence, to present evidence on his behalf and to cross-examine witnesses
presented by the government. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 8, § 7.1, at 7-5.
In this hearing the government must establish that the alien should be deported
by "clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence." See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S.
276, 284 (1966) ("We hold that no deportation order may be entered unless it is
found by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence that the facts alleged are
true."). Prior to the enactment of the 1996 law, if the alien was found deportable,
he had the right to apply for various forms of relief, including a section 212(c)
waiver of deportation. See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 8, § 7.4, at 7-105 to
7-113.
"' The question of law raised by Mojica's section 2241 habeas corpus
petition, although not addressed in this Comment, is whether section 440(d) of
the AEDPA may be retroactively applied to lawful permanent residents who had
committed crimes prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, thereby depriving them
of a section 212(c) hearing. See supra note 19 (discussing the debate surrounding
the retroactive application of section 440(d)).
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The Mojica court held unconstitutional "the new policy and
practice of the United States Attorney General to automatically
deport certain legal permanent residents"55 under the AEDPA
without an opportunity for judicial review.56 The court simulta-
neously rendered a decision of equal constitutional magnitude: a
district court retains full subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 to adjudicate cases of lawful permanent residents who are
challenging final orders of deportation under the AEDPA.5 ' The
court further suggested that legal permanent residents should be
granted substantive constitutional rights.5 8 In reaching its conclu-
sion on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the Mojica court
engaged in a two-step process of statutory interpretation. Part II
5 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 136.
56 Id. at 182 ("It is enough to hold now that Soriano was wrong on the
merits. It constituted an arbitrary abuse of power by the Attorney General."). In
In re Soriano, the Attorney General found that the language of the AEDPA
section 440(d) did not specify whether the statute was to be applied to pending
deportation proceedings and held that it did apply to all pending section 212(c)
waiver cases. Int. Dec. 3289, 1996 WL 426888 (AG Op. Feb. 21, 1997).
" Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 159. ("[T]he court cannot here find that Congress
repealed Section 2241 by implication.").
18 Judge Weinstein never specifically states that lawful permanent residents
should be awarded a panoply of substantive constitutional rights; however, his
entire discussion of aliens' rights emphasizes why they should be granted these
rights. Id. at 142-153. For example, he writes: "If we are not a melting pot, it is
generally true that we have at least constitutionally offered full integration to all
citizens and residents, providing open accessto our social, political, technological
and economic structures." Id. at 144. The Judge continues, "[t]here have been
major exceptions to our constitutional and statutory river of equal rights policy
and our national ethos of openness." Id. Further, he writes that "[i]n the 1960s
... the issue was no longer 'whom we shall welcome,' but how many, and how
they could be treated with dignity, due process and equality as legal residents
once they arrived." Id. at 145.
'9 The Mojica court rejected the government's twofold argument. First, the
government argued that because section 106(a) did not explicitly include section
2241 as an exception to its "sole and exclusive" jurisdiction, Congress repealed
the district courts' section 2241 powers in deportation orders. Id. at 160. Second,
the government contended that section 106(a)(10) had limited district court
jurisdiction of final deportation orders to the issues concerning denial of
discretionary relief. Id. at 161.
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will examine the unprecedented analysis and reasoning of the
court's decision.
II. AVOIDING A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
The Mojica court was one of the first courts in the country to
retreat from the brink of unconstitutionality by properly preserving
a lawful permanent resident's right to judicial review.60 Without
this right, the Attorney General would have absolute power to
deport these individuals. 6' Recognizing the dangers of interpreting
00 The United States Constitution is silent on the issue of immigration and,
in particular, deportation proceedings. However, the Constitution in many places
confers rights on "persons" and not just citizens. See U.S. CONST. amend. I
("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peacefully to assemble, and to petition the
government for redress of a grievance"); U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ); U.S. CONST.
amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury .... ");
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... "); U.S. CONST.
amend. VII ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of a trial by jury shall be preserved .... ").
Congress' authority over immigrants, therefore, has been limited by the
Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations of individual rights. See Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (finding aliens protectedby the
Fifteenth and Sixteenth Amendments); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886) (finding aliens protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). The Supreme
Court has stated that deportation implicates the fundamental interests "basic to
human liberty and happiness" and that these interests are protected by the
Constitution. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 33 U.S. 33, 50 (1950). See also
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (stating that deportation proceedings
meet the "essential standards of fairness"); Ng Fung Ho. v. White, 259 U.S. 276,
284 (1922) (stating that individuals subject to deportation are entitled to Fifth
Amendment protections guaranteeing due process of law).
6 Brief of Amicus Curiae by the American Civil Liberties Foundation for
Petitioners at 10, Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (Nos. 97-
1085; 97-1869). If the authority to deport aliens is given to the Attorney General,
she will have control of the entire deportation process from beginning to end. Id.
Currently, the Immigration and Naturalization Service arrests aliens, an
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the AEDPA, the IIRIRA and the 1961 Immigration Act62 for their
alleged policy goals, 63 the court implemented a plain meaning
statutory analysis to hold that statutory habeas corpus was unaffect-
ed by the enactment of the 1996 immigration laws.
A. The District Courts Retain Full Habeas Corpus Powers
Under Section 2241 to Hear Petitions for Final Orders
of Deportation
The 1996 Supreme Court decision in Felker v Turpin,64
applying the clear statement rule, substantiates the Mojica court's
immigration judge and the BIA hears their cases and the judiciary hears their
appeals. Id. However, if aliens are precluded from appealing to the federal
judiciary, the Attorney General will also have the power to deport these
individuals without any form of review. Id. Thus, aliens would be subjected to
an immigration system that is permitted to interpret statutes and enforce them at
its discretion. Id. These discretionary decisions, in turn, would be insulated from
judicial scrutiny. See Michael G. Heyman, Judicial Review of Discretionary
Inmigration Decisionmaking, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861, 863 (1994) (stating
that discretion has been used to justify potentially arbitrary immigration
decisionmaking and further has "become a mantle insulating immigration
decisions from meaningful review").
62 In 1961, Congress amended the INA and enacted section 106(a) which
provided that the courts of appeal "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for
the judicial review of final orders of deportation." Immigration and Nationality
Act § 106(a) (repealed by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)). The legislative intent
behind § 106(a) was to "expedite the deportation of undesirable aliens by
preventing successive dilatory appeals to various federal courts." Foti v. United
States, 375 U.S. 217, 225 (1963). INA section 106(a)(10) stated that "any alien
in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain judicial review thereof
by habeas corpus proceedings." Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(a)(10).
See infra note 79 (discussing the legislative history of section 106 and
interpretive case law).
63 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 162 ("'Accommodation' of general policy goals
based on suggest[ions] of congressional intent are, however, not appropriate in
this context."). The policy goals referred to by the Mojica court include
expediting the removal of criminal aliens from the United States and the
elimination of judicial review of decisions rendered by INS officials. Id. See also
Converse, supra note 43, at 10.
64 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
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plain meaning approach to the AEDPA, the IIRIRA and the 1961
Immigration Act.65 The Mojica court accurately noted that "[o]nly
upon a clear statutory statement-a specific, express and unambigu-
ous directive-can a court conclude that Congress meant to repeal
an independent area of jurisdiction. '66 The Mojica court applied
this rule to each statutory provision in question.
1. The Impact of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA
on Section 2241 Powers
The Mojica court first determined that neither the AEDPA nor
the IIRIRA eliminate district courts' section 2241 powers.67 The
court correctly rejected the government's argument that the title of
AEDPA section 401(e), "Elimination of Custody Review By
Habeas Corpus," repealed INA habeas jurisdiction under Section
2241.68 The Mojica court, applying the clear statement rule
enunciated in Felker v. Turpin, found that because this language
does not mention section 2241 of Title 28, it cannot be read to
repeal it.
69
6 The clear statement rule was first delineated by the Supreme Court in Ex
Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 92 (1868). The jurisdictional modifying question
presented in Yerger was whether a congressional act revoked the Supreme
Court's power to entertain habeas power under section 14 of The Judiciary Act
of 1789. Id. at 88. The Court held that the Act did not eliminate its jurisdiction
because it "contained no repealing words" and "repeals by implication are not
favored." Id. at 104. In Felker v. Turpin, the Court considered whether a
jurisdiction-modifying provision under the AEDPA eliminated the Supreme
Court's authority to hear habeas petitions brought under section 2241. 518 U.S.
651, 660 (1996). The Court, citing to Yerger, unanimously held that because the
"AEDPA makes no mention of our authority to hear habeas petitions filed as
original matters in this court ... we decline to find a ... repeal of 2241 of Title
28 ... by implication . I..." ld. (citing Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. at 660). The
Supreme Court's holding in Felker is the most recent affirmation of the clear
statement rule.
66 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 159.
67 Id. at 163.
68 ld. at 158.
69 Id. at 159. The court in Yesil v. Reno also dismissed this argument on the
same grounds:
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Similarly, the court rejected the government's statutory
interpretation that AEDPA section 440(a) repealed section 2241.7°
AEDPA section 440(a) provides that "any final order of deportation
against an alien who is deportable by reason of having committed
[certain crimes] shall not be subject to review by any court."71
Therefore, since there were no repealing words in this provision
specifically referring to section 2241, a repeal of section 2241
cannot be read into the statute.72
Lastly, the IIRIRA's transitional provision, section 309(c)(4)(G)
states "there shall be no appeal permitted" in the case of certain
criminal aliens. Again, there is no mention of section 2241. None
of the aforementioned provisions specifically address section 2241
habeas review, much less repeal it.73 The Mojica court, therefore,
[T]he government argues that the plain language of the AEDPA repeals
habeas jurisdiction under Section 2241 not implicitly but "expressly,"
pointing among other things, to the heading of Section 401(e):
"Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus." The government
is simply incorrect. The plain language does not expressly repeal
Section 2241. Nor does the heading to Section 401(e) carry much
weight, for other headings contradict the government's argument.
Section 401 is entitled "Alien Terrorist Removal" and is part of
Subtitle A, "Removal of Alien Terrorists." In contrast, Section 440 is
entitled "Criminal Alien Removal" and is part of Subtitle D, "Criminal
Alien Procedural Improvements." Hence one could reasonably argue,
on the basis of the headings, that Section' 401 has no application to
Yesil at all, as no suggestion has been made that he was an "Alien
Terrorist."
958 F. Supp. 828, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citations omitted).
70 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 160.
71 Id.
71 id. The Mojica court states: "Congress is expert in the process of
lawmaking. Had it desired to repeal section 2241, or render it inapplicable to
challenges deportation orders, it would have taken the necessary steps to do so."
Id. See also Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 105 (1868) (stating "repeals by
implication are not favored").
71 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 160 ("This-as Congress is doubtlessly aware-is
the purpose of the clear statement rule: courts do not have to resort to divining
phantom or unarticulated congressional intentions to repeal habeas corpus
jurisdiction where there is statutory silence.").
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precisely implements the clear statement rule: without a clearly
expressed mandate, no repeal is permitted.
7 4
As noted in Mojica, nearly every district court in the country
to address the issue of habeas jurisdiction has held that the AEDPA
and the IIRIRA have not withdrawn their section 2241 habeas
jurisdiction.7 5 The Mojica opinion distinguishes itself from these
courts by holding that the scope of section 2241 is not narrowed in
any aspect by the 1996 immigration laws. 6 The majority of
district courts have not strictly applied the Felker v Turpin clear
statement rule. Instead, these courts narrowed judicial review under
section 2241 to only those cases that present "substantial constitu-
tional" claims77 so as to accommodate Congress' intentions in
passing the AEDPA and the IIRIRA. The Mojica court's approach
to analyzing the AEDPA and the IIRIRA is, therefore, strikingly
different from these courts.78
71 See supra note 65 (delineating the clear statement rule).
75 See, e.g., Lee v. Reno, 15 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 1998); Avelar-Cruz v.
Reno, 6 F. Supp. 2d 744 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Billett v. Reno, 2 F. Supp. 2d 368
(W.D.N.Y. 1998); Barrett v. INS, 997 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Rusu v.
Reno, 999 F. Supp. 1204 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Gutierrez-Martinezv. Reno, 989 F.
Supp. 1205 (N.D. Ga. 1998); Thompson v. Perryman, No. 98 C 1596, 1998 WL
473471 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 1998); Zisimopoulos v. Reno, No. Civ. A 98-1863,
1998 WL 437266 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 1998); Morisath v. Smith, 998 F. Supp.
1333 (W.D. Wash. 1997); Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. La.
1997); Vargas v. Reno, 996 F. Supp. 1537 (S.D. Cal. 1997); Gutierrezv. Greene,
977 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Colo. 1997); Duldulao v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 476 (D.
Haw. 1997); Eltayeb v. Ingham, 950 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Jurado-
Moore v. INS, 956 F. Supp. 878 (D. Neb. 1997); Thomas v. INS, 975 F. Supp.
840 (W.D. Ca. 1997); Ozoanya v. Reno, 968 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997); Yesil v.
Reno, 958 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Jennifer v. Powell, 937 F. Supp. 1245
(E.D. Mich. 1996). See supra note 16 (listing the circuit courts that have
similarly upheld section 2241's habeas corpus power).
76 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 163.
77 See supra note 19 (discussing district court cases that restrict judicial
review under section 2241).
78 See supra notes 16 and 18 (discussing the respective decisions of the
circuit and district courts analyzing the AEDPA and the IIRIRA).
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2. The 1961 Immigration Act
The real battle over the district courts' section 2241 habeas
corpus jurisdiction, however, lies with the 1961 Immigration Act
(the "Act").7 9 The Act was passed by Congress to expedite and
'9 The controversy over the district courts' jurisdiction to review final orders
of deportation under section 2241 stems from the ambiguous jurisdictional
modifying mandates of section 106 of the 1961 Immigration Act. Act of Sept.
26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650 (repealed 1996). After the passage
of the 1961 Immigration Act, the Supreme Court never addressed the issue of
whether habeas corpus relief remained available to the district courts in
challenges to deportation orders under section 106(a)(10) or section 2241. See id.
However, the Court did hold that matters directly incident to final orders of
deportation fell within section 106(a)'s grant of direct review jurisdiction to
courts of appeals. See Jorge v. Hart, No. 97 Civ. 1119, 1997 WL 531309, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1997) (citing Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18, 85 (1964);
Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 232 (1963)). In addition, the Court held that decisions
not directly related to deportation did not fall within section 106(a)'s grant of
jurisdiction to courts of appeals to review deportation orders. Id. (citing Cheng
Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 216 (1968)). Federal courts around the country,
acknowledging that sections 106(a) and 106(a)(10) were not "models of clarity,"
attempted to resolve the ambiguity. See Daneshvar v. Chauvin, 644 F.2d 1248,
1250 (8th Cir. 1981); United States ex rel. Marcello v. District Dir., 634 F.2d
964 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981).
Until the passage of the AEDPA, section 106 was the law governing judicial
review of deportation orders. Section 106(a) granted courts of appeals "sole and
exclusive authority" for all "judicial review of all final orders of deportation...
made against aliens in the United States." Act of Sept. 26, 1961 § 5a, Pub. L.
No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650, 651-53; 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (repealed 1997). Section
106(a)(10) provided that "any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of
deportation may obtain judicial review thereof by habeas corpus proceedings."
8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (1994) (repealed 1996). The ambiguities in the language
as well as the interplay of these provisions with federal habeas corpus statute
section 2241 have left circuit courts split over their interpretations.
A minority of courts interpret the provisions as eliminating section 2241
powers in the district courts. For example, the Eighth Circuit in Daneshvar v.
Chauvin held that the district courts did not have the jurisdiction to review any
matter relating to deportation orders. 644 F.2d 1248, 1250 (8th Cir. 1981).
Rather, it held that under section 106(a)(10) the district courts could only hear
habeas corpus petitions when the deportation itself was not an issue. The court
stated:
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[I]t makes more sense, and furthers the congressional purpose to avoid
delay ... to construe section 106(a) to confer exclusive jurisdiction on
courts of appeals in all cases where the validity of a final order of
deportation is drawn in question, and to limit section 106[(a)(10)] to
review of the denial of discretionary relief where deportability itself is
not an issue.
Id. at 1251. The court rejected the petitioner's argument that 106(a)(10) granted
district courts jurisdiction whenever the petitioner is "in custody," while section
106(a) gave courts of appeals the jurisdiction to hear those cases where the
petitioner is not in custody. Id. The court dismissed this argument as not
"rmak[ing] a great deal of sense since nothing would be left of the courts of
appeals' jurisdiction and, further, would contradict the legislative intent to avoid
delay in deporting aliens." Id. In so holding, however, the court did not cite to
any legislative authority or statutory language supporting its restrictive
interpretation of section 106. See also Salehi v. District Dir., 796 F. Supp. 1286,
1290 (10th Cir. 1986); E1-Youseffv. Meese, 678 F. Supp. 1508, 1514 (D. Kan.
1988).
The majority of courts, though, hold that district courts' habeas jurisdiction
under section 2241 remains unaffected by the section 106 provisions. For
example, the often quoted Fifth Circuit decision of United States ex rel. Marcello
v. District Director held that sections 106(a) and 106(a)(10) did not repeal the
district court of its section 2241 powers and that there was no statutory language
or legislative history to indicate that its section 2241 powers had been amended.
634 F.2d at 971-72. The court concluded that sections 106(a) and 106(a)(10)
were enacted by Congress to provide for two modes of review, "one available
to aliens not 'held in custody' and the other for those who were." Id. at 972. The
court reasoned that Congress intended "to abolish in as many cases as possible,
the district court step in direct appeals and the employment by the alien of both
modes of successive review." Id. Thus, the court only limited the district courts'
review of deportation cases where the petitioner was "in custody" under section
106(a)(10). Id.
The Supreme Court's decision in Foti v. INS evidences additional support
for the Marcello court's holding. 375 U.S. 217 (1963). The Foti Court spoke
only to the narrow issue of whether "the Federal Courts of Appeals have the
initial, exclusive jurisdiction under Section 106(a) of the INA, to review
discretionary detem-inations of the Attorney General." Id. at 229. In its decision,
however, the Supreme Court specifically stated: "And, of course, our decision in
this case in no way impairs the preservation and availability of habeas corpus
relief." Id. at 231. This dicta has been interpreted as reaffirming the Marcello
court's holding that sections 106(a) and 106(a)(10) do not affect a district court's
habeas corpus powers. See Orozco v. INS, 911 F.2d 539 (11th Cir. 1990);
Williams v. INS, 795 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1986).
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improve upon what it perceived to be an inefficient system of
judicial review of deportation orders. 8° Until the passage of the
AEDPA, section 106 of the Act was the law governing judicial
review of deportation orders. Section 106(a) granted courts of
appeals "sole and exclusive authority" for judicial review of all
final orders of deportation. 81 Further, section 106(a)(10) provided
that an alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation
could seek judicial review by habeas corpus proceedings.82 At
issue in Mojica, therefore, was: (1) whether Congress had limited
habeas corpus jurisdiction under section 106(a)(l 0) so as to provide
a single avenue of judicial review in the court of appeals under
section 106(a); and (2) the interpretation of case law on the
interplay of section 106(a) and section 106(a)(10).
The government's position on the statutory analysis of the
1961 Immigration Act was that INA's section 106(a) provision
provided the courts of appeals with "sole and exclusive" jurisdic-
tion to review final deportation orders;83 because section 2241 was
Since the passage of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA, the controversy over INA
section 106's jurisdictional mandate continues to remain unresolved. AEDPA's
section 440(a), which repealed INA section 106(a)(10), provides that "[a]ny final
order of deportation against an alien who is deportable by reason of having
committed [certain crimes] shall not be subject to judicial review by any court."
See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 106(a)(10), 66 Stat.
163 (1952) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) and amended April 26, 1996 by
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § § 401 (e), 440(a)). The IIRIRA,
enacted six months later, further eliminated judicial review of deportation cases
in the courts of appeals stating that "there shall be no appeal of any discretionary
decisions under the [INA] section 212(c)" and "there shall be no appeal permitted
in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable by having committed
a criminal offense covered in [INA] Section 212(a)(2) or Section
241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D)." See generally Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, Section 306,
110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
80 See Jorge v. Hart, No. 97 Civ. 1119, 1997 WL 531309, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 28, 1997).
8 Act of Sept. 26, 1961 § 5a, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650, 651-53; 8
U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (repealed 1997).
82 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (1994) (repealed 1996).
13 Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 161-62, aff'd in part, dismissed in
part, question certifiedsub nom. Henderson v. INS, 157 F. 3d 106 (2d Cir 1998).
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not cited as an exception to the provision, Congress intended to
repeal section 2241.84 Moreover, the remaining portion of section
106(a)(10) limited district courts' power to review deportation
orders concerning issues relating only to discretionary relief;
therefore, when the AEDPA repealed section 106(a)(10), judicial
review by district courts was lost.85 Thus, the government con-
tended that the district courts' section 2241 habeas jurisdiction was
eliminated thirty-seven years ago and today, at most, deportable
aliens only retain a right to appeal to the courts of appeals when
there is a fundamental miscarriage of justice.86 Further, the
government interpreted Second Circuit case law under Garay v
Slattery to preclude district court habeas review under section
84 Id.
85 After the passage of the 1961 Immigration Act, most courts ruling on the
scope of section 106(a)(10) held that the district courts did have some form of
habeas corpus jurisdiction despite the ambiguous language of section 106(a)(10);
however, their opinions and rationale regarding the scope of that power have
varied greatly. Compare Marcello v. District Dir., 634 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1981)
(stating that there is little indication, either in the statute or the legislative history
that suggests the congressional plan and purpose in enacting section 1105 was to
restrict habeas corpus review in the district courts), with Daneshavarv. Chauvin,
644 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that section 1105 is to be construed as
restricting district courts' power to review final orders of deportation).
86 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 160. In its brief, the government contends that
because section 2241 is not referenced in the enumerated exceptions to the "sole
and exclusive" procedure adopted by INA section 106, section 2241 cannot
independently operate as an exception. Respondents' Memorandum of Law in
Support of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss Petitioners'/Plaintiffs' Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 12,
Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (Nos. 97-1085; 97-1869)
[hereinafter Respondents' Memorandum of Law]. Thus, with respect to final
deportation orders, INA section 106(a)(10)'s authorization of habeas review was
not in addition to, but in substitution for, the general authorization of habeas
review at section 2241. Id. The government interprets a fundamental miscarriage
of justice to be one that violates any provision of the Constitution. Id. at 27
("Specifically, these statutes [AEDPA and IIRIRA] do not violate Article III's
principle of Separation of Powers, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
or the Suspension Clause.").
87 23 F.3d 744 (2d Cir. 1994). According to the government's interpretation
of Garay, only matters ancillary to the deportation order can be addressed by the
district court. 1d. Thus, the government concluded that prior to the AEDPA, the
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106. 88 The government contended that the Garay court held INA
section 106(a)(10) to preclude district courts from considering
appeals of final orders of deportation. 89 Instead, a habeas petition-
er would have to bring a challenge pertaining to a final order to the
court of appeals. ° The Mojica court, however, rejected both of
these arguments.
Applying the clear statement rule, the Mojica court concluded
that neither section 106(a) nor section 106(a)(10) repealed section
2241 habeas power because these provisions do not mention or
refer to section 2241. 9' Moreover, although the government's
argument that section 2241 habeas jurisdiction was eliminated by
the 1961 Immigration Act finds some support in case law,92 there
is precedent to support an alternative interpretation: section 106
does not preclude a district court's habeas review.93
With regard to Second Circuit case law, the Mojica opinion
noted that the court in Garay never stated that section 106 barred
district courts from section 2241 review of final orders of deporta-
tion.94 In Garay, the court held that the district court could not
hear a stay of deportation. 95 The issue before the court, therefore,
district court did not have jurisdiction to review Mojica's case and cannot have
the jurisdiction today. Id. Judge Weinstein, however, rejected these theories and
ruled that, although the language of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA purports to
eliminate all judicial review on its face, there is no express mention of a repeal
of the district courts section 2241 habeas powers in these laws or in the section
106 provisions. Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 163. Thus, no repeal can or will be
implied.
88 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 162.
89 Respondents' Memorandum Of Law, supra note 86, at 18.
90 Id.
9' Id. at 163.
92 See, e.g., Salehi v. District Dir., 796 F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1986);
Daneshvar v. Chauvin, 644 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir. 1981); E1-Youssefv. Meese, 678
F. Supp. 1508 (D. Kan. 1988).
93 See, e.g., Orozco v. INS, 911 F.2d 539, 541 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (recognizing
that "challenges to deportation proceedings are cognizable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241"); Williams v. INS, 795 F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that
"habeas jurisdiction exists whenever the petitioner is in custody, regardless of the
reach of section 106(a)'s exclusive jurisdiction").
94 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 162.
9' 23 F.3d 744, 746 (2d Cir. 1994).
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was not whether the 1961 Immigration Act precluded district courts
from reviewing challenges to final deportation orders.96 As the
petitioners in Mojica noted in their brief, the interpretation that the
government gleaned from Garay is inferential. 97 Specifically, the
petitioners' argued:
The Second Circuit has never addressed whether the 1961
Act permitted an alien to challenge a deportation order in
a habeas action and the government relies solely on
negative inferences ... in which the court found that
review was available to challenge other types of immigra-
tion decisions ancillary to a final order.9"
Furthermore, even if the Garay court implicitly intended to repeal
the district courts' section 2241 jurisdiction, the Mojica court's
analysis of INA section 106 is wholly supported by the statute's
language and legislative history.99 Therefore, the Mojica court
acknowledged these differences in interpretation, but dismissed
96 Id. at 744.
9' Petitioners' Brief at 41 n.25, Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130
(E.D.N.Y.) (Nos. 97-1085; 97-1869).
98 id.
" The court in Jorge v. Hart agreed with the Mojica court's interpretation
of section 106 and stated that the "problem" with the Second Circuit's
interpretation of the pre-AEDPA provision is that:
[T]he language, legislative history, structure and purpose of the INA
reveal that the majority of the circuits properly interpreted INA Section
106 and its interplay with Section 2241, and that under Section 106,
district courts actually had habeas corpus jurisdiction to review
deportation orders when the alien was in custody ... the best way to
have construed Section 106(a)(10) was a operating in tandem with
Section 2241 to confer jurisdiction on district courts to review
deportation orders and to issue writs when the alien was in custody.
No. 97 Civ. 1119, 1997 WL 531309, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 1997) (citations
omitted). In affirming Mojica, the Second Circuit did not mention its decision
in Garay or the debate surrounding its interpretation. See Henderson v. INS, 157
F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998). Rather, the court wrote that its decision to uphold
section 2241 habeas review is "guided by a century's worth of Supreme Court
decisions" granting immigrants the writ of habeas corpus in deportation
proceedings. Id. at 106.
MOJICA v. RENO
them as "debatable."100 The Mojica decision relies, instead, on the
clear statement rule.' 0'
The Mojica court's interpretation of the 1961 Immigration Act
is supported by the Act's legislative history. The following is an
excerpt from the House Report:
In substance an alien aggrieved by [a deportation] order
may seek judicial review by filing a petition in the U.S.
circuit court of appeals. The writ of habeas corpus is
specifically reserved to an alien held in custody pursuant
to an order of deportation.
The section carefully preserves the writ of habeas corpus
to an alien detained in custody pursuant to a deportation
order.
The section clearly specifies that the right to habeas corpus
is preserved to an alien in custody under a deportation
order. In that fashion, it excepts habeas corpus from the
language which elsewhere declares that the procedure
prescribed for judicial review in circuit courts shall be
exclusive. The section in no way disturbs The Habeas
Corpus Act in respect to the courts which may issue writs
of habeas corpus; aliens are not limited to courts of
appeals in seeking habeas corpus.
Overall, the committee emphasizes that regardless of any
time limitations upon the judicial procedure provided by
the bill, there is always available to an alien in custody
under a deportation order the right to apply for a writ of
habeas corpus for the purpose of questioning the validity
of the order.'0 2
1oo Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 160.
'0' Id. at 159.
102 H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong. (1961), reprintedin 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2950, 2966, 2971, 2973, 2974 (emphasis added).
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The language clearly states that an alien can seek habeas relief in
a district court. Further, the reference to "The Habeas Corpus Act"
can be interpreted as a specific reference to section 2241.'03
There is additional legislative history, not cited in Mojica,
which further supports the court's conclusion. For instance, the
following excerpts are from speeches delivered on the House floor
prior to the passage of the 1961 Immigration Act:
Nothing contained in this bill is, or can be, designed to
prevent an alien from obtaining review by habeas cor-
PU. 04pus. 0
I think this is a bad bill. I do not think that it will accom-
plish its purpose, for even though you pass this bill, it does
not preclude a district court judge from doing a writ.10 5
A letter in the Congressional Record from the then Deputy
Attorney General Byron R. White, explaining to the Justice
Department his view of the 1961 legislation, adds additional
support to Judge Weinstein's holding:
Aliens seeking review of administrative orders should be
given full and fair opportunity to do so, but the present
possibilities of review pose undesirable obstacles to
deportation of aliens who have been ordered deported and
have had their day in court. An alien subject to a deporta-
tion order, having lost his case in declaratory judgment or
injunction proceeding may thereafter sue out a writ of
habeas corpus when taken into custody. Moreover, as the
'03 Section 2241 traces its ancestry to the Constitution. See SOKOL, supra
note 13, at 38 (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963) ("The
habeas corpus jurisdictional statute implements the constitutional command that
the writ of habeas corpus be made available.")). Habeas corpus was then given
statutory roots in the Habeas Corpus Act of May 27, 1679 and section 2241 was
specifically established in section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Sunal v.
Large, 157 F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1946) (explaining that 28 U.S.C. § 451 is a
decedent of The Habeas Corpus Act), aff'd, 332 U.S. 712 (1947); see also
SOKOL, supra note 13, at 40.
0o4 107 CONG. REC. 12,176 (1961) (statement of Rep. Walter).
'05 107 CONG. REC. 12,179 (1961) (statement of Rep. Libonati).
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law now stands, it is possible to seek relief by habeas
corpus repeatedly.'°6
Therefore, on grounds of statutory interpretation and legislative
history,'°7 the Mojica court was correct in holding that the district
courts still have section 2241 habeas corpus powers to review final
orders of deportation.
106 H.R. REP. No. 565, at 1 (1961) (emphasis added).
'07 With respect to the AEDPA and the IIRIRA, the Mojica court never
explicitly addresses the government's legislative history argument that the
AEDPA's intent was to preclude all judicial review, including section 2241. That
is, perhaps, because the government only offered the remarks of Michigan
Senator Spencer Abraham to support this proposition and none of the Senator's
remarks addressed the specific language of the AEDPA that is in controversy.
Respondents' Memorandum of Law, supra note 86, at 16. Clearly, Senator
Abraham's remarks illustrate the legislators' intent to end the abuse of successive
petitions challenging final orders of deportation. See 142 CONG. REC. S4363-64
(1996).
Recently, and contrary to the government's argument in Mojica, Senator
Abraham publicly expressed that the intent of the 1996 Immigration Laws was
not to summarily deport legal permanent aliens convicted of crimes. See Mirta
Ojito, Old Crime Returns to Haunt an Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1997,
at B 1. Rather, the Senator suggested that the laws are having too harsh an impact
on immigrants:
Joseph P. McMongile, communications director for Senator Spencer
Abraham, a Michigan Republican who supports tougher laws against
immigrants who are criminals, said the immigration agency was going
too far. "It is puzzling to us that I.N.S. continues to pursue cases
involving individuals who have committed crimes 20 years ago,
rehabilitated themselves and are making contributions to society," he
said.
Id. His assertion, therefore, strongly suggests that the 1996 Immigration Laws
were never intended to leave aliens seeking relief from deportation without an
avenue of judicial review. Id. Mr. McMonigle also stated: "The dispute over how
to interpret the 1996 laws may prompt members of Congress to call immigration
hearings and, if necessary, introduce a bill next year amending some of the
language of the law .... "
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B. The Scope of the District Court's Section 2241
Habeas Power Has Not Been Narrowed
The Mojica court not only held that it retains section 2241
habeas powers under the AEDPA and the IIRIRA, but it is was the
first court in the country to state that "the scope of Section 2241
[relief] remains unaffected."' 08 In so holding, the court rejected
the rationale of numerous district courts that conclude that section
2241's scope has been narrowed"°9 to allow review of only
constitutional questions of "fundamental miscarriage[s] of jus-
tice. ' '  Upon finding that the AEDPA and the IIRIRA have not
fully eliminated their habeas jurisdiction,"' these courts avoid the
' Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in part,
dismissed in part, question certified sub nom. Henderson v. INS, 157 F. 3d 106
(2d Cir. 1998).
'09 Id. at 162. Mbiya v. INS was the first court in the country to deal with
habeas petitions under AEDPA section 440(a). 930 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ga.
1996). The Mbiya court held that it had habeas corpus powers under section
2241, but only to hear petitions "in which the petitioner's deportation would
result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Id. at 612. The court reasoned
that its section 2241 powers were curtailed because "the newly amended section
1105a(a)(10) strongly suggests that Congress intended to preserve the writ of
habeas corpus under section 2241 in these cases only to the extent required by
the Constitution." Id. It concluded under this restrictive view that only issues of
due process qualified as "fundamental miscarriages of justice." Id. The court's
statutory interpretation has been called an implausible "feat of acrobatics," since
nowhere in the statute is any such limitation enunciated. Note, The Constitutional
Requirement of Judicial Review For Administrative Deportation Decisions, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1850, 1860 (1997). Despite the tenuous grounds on which its
holding is premised, the majority of district courts have followed the Mbiya
court. See Duldulao v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 476 (D. Haw. 1997); Moore v. INS,
956 F. Supp. 878 (D. Neb. 1997); Eltayeb v. Ingham, 950 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Powell v. Jennifer, 937 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
"o Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 162. See also Duldulao, 958 F. Supp. at 480;
Eltayeb, 950 F. Supp. at 99; Mbiya, 930 F. Supp. at 613; Powell, 937 F. Supp.
at 1252. A substantial constitutional claim or a miscarriage of justice is defined
by the courts as one which is "cognizable under traditional habeas proceedings
such as allegations of constitutional due process or equal protection violations."
Galaviz-Medina v. Wooten, 27 F.3d 487, 492 (10th Cir. 1994).
. But see Theck v. INS, No. C. 96-4668, 1997 WL 37565 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
14, 1997) (holding courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to hear habeas
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serious constitutional ramifications raised by the AEDPA and the
IIRIRA by leaving open only the single, albeit narrow, avenue of
judicial review required by the Constitution. The Mojica decision,
in holding to the contrary, is unprecedented.
The Mojica court noted that the rationale for diminishing the
scope of section 2241 is to effectuate Congress' policy goal of
expediting the deportation of criminal aliens and restricting j udicial
review of final orders of deportation to the greatest extent possi-
ble. 1 2 In rejecting "accommodation" ' 3 of these general policy
goals, the Mojica court correctly pointed to the Felker Court's
holding that limitations to jurisdictional power cannot be implied
but must be expressly stated." 4 As discussed earlier, section 2241
was never mentioned in the AEDPA, the IIRIRA or the 1961
Immigration Act." 5 The court, therefore, concluded in lieu of an
express abridgement of section 2241 power, that the district courts'
habeas power has not been amended." 6 Thus, the Mojica court
held, in accordance with the mandate of the Felker Court, that its
section 2241 powers are fully intact."'
The Mojica court's analysis, therefore, stands on solid legal
ground. None of the courts that have modified section 2241's
petitions under 29 U.S.C. § 2241); United States ex rel. Morgan v. McElroy, 981
F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (concluding that section 2241 barred all avenues
of judicial review, including habeas corpus); Mayers v. Reno, 977 F. Supp. 1457
(S.D. Fla. 1997) (finding that Congress has "eliminated all avenues of judicial
review of criminal orders of deportation under habeas corpus").
12 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 162.
13 Id. at 163 ("'Accommodation' of general policy goals based on 'sug-
gest[ions]' of congressional intent are, however, not appropriate in this context.
Fidelity to Felker and Yerger and the requirements of the clear statement rule
militates against reading such limitations into the scope of section 2241").
114 Id.
'5 See supra note 65 (discussing the clear statement rule enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Felker v. Turpin).
116 Mojica, 970 F. Supp at 163.
"7 Id. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the Mojica court's analysis
and noted: "[I]n the absence of a clear statement from Congress indicating its
intent to do so, we are reluctant to snip words from the middle of the habeas
statute." Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 120 n.1 (2d Cir. 1998). The
Henderson court, however, found that section 2241 jurisdiction remains available
only to those aliens who have "substantial" constitutional claims. Id. at 122.
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breadth of power have substantiated their holdings with any support
from either the text of the AEDPA or the IIRIRA or the legislative
history of these statutes.1I8
III. LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO
SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Immigration law is at a crossroads and stands ready to embark
upon significant transformation. Following the enactment of the
AEDPA and the IIRIRA, one scholar called 1996 "the year in
which immigration law died,""9 while yet another applauded the
demise of the plenary power doctrine. 2 ' At this critical juncture,
'" For example, the court in Mbiya v. LN.S., 930 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ga.
1996), stated:
Nevertheless the provisions of AEDPA make clear that Congress
desired to expedite the deportation of criminal aliens and to restrict all
judicial review of final orders of deportation to the greatest extent
possible . . . [and this] strongly suggests that Congress intended to
preserve the writ of habeas corpus under Section 2241 in these cases
only to the extent required by the Constitution.
Id. at 612.
'9 Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut.- Discretion
and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 704 (1997).
121 Motomura, supra note 8, at 548. In early immigration cases, the Supreme
Court established the plenary power doctrine which instilled Congress and the
Executive Branch with broad, and often, exclusive authority in immigration
matters. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). When implemented, this
doctrine allows Congress to regulate-with few constitutional limits-the
admission of aliens into the United States. See Benson, supra note 13, at 1412.
Thus, as Hiroshi Motomura explains, the "courts [under the doctrine] should only
rarely, if ever, and in a limited fashion, entertain constitutional challenges to
decisions about which aliens should be admitted or expelled." See Motomura,
supra note 7, at 545. The seminal case in which the Supreme Court announced
this policy of judicial deference was The Chinese Exclusion Case. Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). In that opinion Justice Field wrote:
"[If Congress] considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this
country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and
security ... its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary." Id. at 606.
However, in recent decades, scholars have reported an erosion of the
plenary power doctrine and, today, with the radical changes that the AEDPA and
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the Mojica opinion offers a new vision for a field deemed "radical-
ly isolated and divergent" from the rest of the legal system. 21 It
urges that legal resident aliens and, in turn, immigration law should
be protected by the substantive guarantees of the Constitution. 122
The Supreme Court for nearly a century has promulgated the
plenary power doctrine through which it provides Congress and the
executive branch with almost exclusive power over immigration
regulations. 23 The judiciary, under the plenary power doctrine,
has traditionally viewed immigration law as separate and distinct
the IIRIRA have initiated, scholars are pondering what new trend in immigration
law will emerge. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration
Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 1625, 1629 (1992).
21 Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 1 (1984) (calling immigration law a "maverick" and a "wild card" in
American public law because it "has been so radically isolated and divergent
from those fundamental norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure,
and judicial role that animates the rest of our legal system").
122 Aliens have traditionally been extended only procedural Constitutional
rights. See Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993
Wis. L. REV. 965, 966. ("Although states are prohibited, in most cases, from
treating aliens differently than citizens and although aliens are entitled to many
of the criminal protections of the Bill of Rights, the federal government remains
largely free from constitutional constraints in its treatment of aliens."). As
Scaperlanda commented:
For more than a century the Supreme Court has recognized that aliens
are 'persons' entitled to constitutional protection. In many respects, this
protection has proven illusory. Although states are prohibited, in most
cases, from treating aliens differently than citizens, and although aliens
are entitled to many of the criminal procedure protections of the Bill
of Rights, the federal government remains largely free from constitu-
tional constraints in its treatment of aliens.
Id. at 965.
123 See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542
(1950) ("The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty ...
whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an
alien denied entry is concerned."); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 660 (1892) (stating that unnaturalized and nonresident foreigners seeking
admission to the United States are subject to "the decisions of executive or
administrative officers, acting with in the powers expressly conferred by
Congress, are due process of law"). See also Motomura, supra note 8, at 545.
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from other areas of the law because of its close ties to foreign poli-
cy.124 This connection to politics has prompted the judiciary to be
more deferential to the political branches and administrative
agencies. 2  The Mojica court, however, explicitly rejected the
plenary power doctrine.'26 The court stated that the Attorney
General was "undeserving of deference"'27 for her incorrect and
unsubstantiated interpretation and application of the AEDPA. 28
More significantly, the court emphasized the importance of the
district courts' power to provide lawful permanent residents with
constitutional protections, such as the right to habeas corpus
review. 2 9 By first acknowledging that resident aliens are entitled
124 Schuck, supra note 121, at 14.
125 The three federal bodies that administer immigration procedures are: the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), the Department of State and the
Department of Labor. See Motomura, supra note 120. The INS, which handles
most immigration matters, oversees border enforcement, deportation of aliens,
visa petitions, adjustments of immigration status, and citizenship adjudication.
See Motomura, supra note 120. The Department of State issues visas abroad
through embassies and consulates. The Department of Labor processes petitions
for employment-related visas to ensure compliance with all labor statutes and
regulations. See Motomura supra note 120.
126 The plenary power doctrine and the rationale for its rejection was
described by the Mojica court as follows:
[A]n older view [of foreign policy] was that aliens need not be
protected under the Constitution in the same way as citizens. Treatment
of foreign aliens was viewed as an aspect of foreign relations,
intimately related to foreign policy interests. Thus ... where the
distinction between citizen and alien appears to have little significance
for U.S. foreign relations, discrimination against aliens needs reconsid-
eration.
Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in part, dismissed
in part, question certified sub non. Henderson v. INS, 157 F. 3d 106 (2d Cir.
1998) (quoting and referencing Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 293-97 (2d ed. 1996)).
127 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 181.
128 ld. at 182.
129 "Yet if the writ is to be an efficacious check in the confinement and
deportation of liberty attending physical removal of persons from the United
States, judicial review of [deportation and] removal must not be precluded." Id.
at 153 (quoting Trevor Morrison, RemovedFrom The Constitution?: Deportable
Aliens Access to Habeas Corpus Under the New Immigration Legislation, 35
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to this procedural constitutional protection in deportation proceed-
ings before a federal court, the court began an analysis that
emphatically undermined the plenary power doctrine.13
0
Historically, the Supreme Court's only exception to the plenary
power doctrine has been its willingness to grant aliens procedural
due process rights because of the harsh consequences wrought by
deportation.' 3' It has also been proposed that procedural issues
are more appropriate for the judiciary to decide, since these
questions relate to "values of accuracy, participation and predict-
ability;' 3 12 whereas, the political branches are better equipped to
weigh substantive policy issues. 33 Regardless of the reasoning
behind the plenary power doctrine, courts have retained a hands-off
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 697, 721 (1997)).
3' The plenary power doctrine is rooted in the notion of a sovereign's
unlimited right "to decide whether, under what circumstances and with what
effects it would consent to enter into a relationship with a stranger . . . the
government simply holds no other legal obligation to those who sought to enter
or remain without its consent." See Schuck, supra note 121, at 6.
' See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (noting that "[t]his Court
has not closed its eyes to the drastic deprivations that may follow when a
resident of this country is compelled by our Government to forsake all the bonds
formed here and go to a foreign land where he often has no contemporary
identification"). Further, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of
aliens' procedural rights:
Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits
great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay
and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a
penalty-at times a most severe one-cannot be doubted. Meticulous
care must be exercised lest the procedure which he is deprived of that
liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness.
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945). Lastly, the Court has recognized
aliens' constitutional rights to due process:
To deport one who so claims to be a citizen obviously deprives him of
liberty .... It may result also in less of both property and liberty and
life, or all that makes life worth living. Against the danger of such
deprivation without sanctions afforded by judicial proceedings, the
Fifth Amendment affords protection in its guarantees of due process of
law.
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
132 See Motomura, supra note 120, at 1646.
33 See Motomura, supra note 120, at 1646.
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policy on substantive due process issues in deportation cases.134
The result of this practice has been that aliens, even lawful
permanent residents, are not accorded the substantive guarantees of
the Constitution, but only its minimal procedural guarantees. 
35
The Mojica opinion suggests that the judiciary should depart
from the plenary power doctrine and extend substantive
constitutional rights to lawful permanent residents. 3 6 The court
based its finding on two grounds: the role of immigrants in
American society 37 and international human rights obliga-
138tions.
The court first contended that immigrants have always served
as the foundation of the United States, a "melting pot" of diverse
religions, ethnicities and races. 39 In particular, the Mojica court
viewed immigrants, especially lawful permanent residents, as
representing a positive infusion of labor and diversity in our
society.4 ° According to Judge Weinstein, since immigrants
founded our country, they should be welcomed and treated with
dignity, due process and equality.141 Therefore, the court rea-
soned, since immigrants have played-and continue to play-a vital
'3" See Scaperlanda, supra note 122, at 990.
'3 See Scaperlanda, supra note 122, at 966. But see Benson, supra note 13,
at 1484 (discussing the problems inherent with the "constitutionalization" of
immigration law).
136 The Mojica opinion directs its attention only to legal resident aliens and
not other categories of aliens, such as illegal aliens or refugees. Mojica v. Reno,
970 F. Supp. 130, 142-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in part, dismissed in part,
question certified sub nom. Henderson v. INS, 157 F. 3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998).
117 Id. at 143.
.38 Id. at 146.
"" The Mojica court described the contributions immigrants have made to
the United States accordingly:
Ours is a nation of immigrants and their descendants .... This
country has grown and prospered in a climate of constant refreshment
by the introduction into our midst of adventurous spirits willing to
leave the security and predictability of what they knew in their lands
and rulers they adjured for the hope of full equality of rights and
opportunities within our borders.
Id. at 143.
140 Id. at 145.
41 Id. at 146.
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role in this country's growth, they are entitled to constitutional
rights and not simply procedural privileges.
Second, in a lengthy discussion of internationally recognized
human rights policies, the court looked to international laws that
provide aliens with protection from arbitrary exile. 42 In its
comprehensive analysis of human rights, the court did not suggest
that these laws should be adopted into the Constitution but rather,
in the words of one scholar that:
With the advent of international human rights ... the
implicit or explicit agreement by the nations of the world
to respect those individual rights absolute sovereign power
no longer reigns paramount over individual rights. Given
this new international terrain, the [Supreme] Court is no
longer justified in brushing aside aliens' constitutional
claims for fear of interfering with the national sover-
eign. 14
3
The Mojica opinion emphasizes that the purpose of the plenary
power doctrine-to serve the needs of a nation before those of the
individual-is no longer being adhered to by the international
community.144 Instead, the rights of individuals are superseding
rights once held solely by the sovereign state. 45 Thus, the demise
of the plenary power doctrine can also be seen on the world stage.
The passage of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA has brought
immigration law to a crossroads 46 and the Mojica decision boldly
141 Id. at 146-52. The court cites to a number of treaties and covenants
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention
on Human Rights, the Fundamental Freedoms as well as the Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987). Id.
'3 See Scaperlanda, supra note 122, at 1029.
... Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 146-147.
141 See Scaperlanda, supra note 122, at 1029.
46 See Motomura, supra note 8, at 1629 (contending that the demise of the
plenary power doctrine has sufficiently been eroded so as to prompt questions
about what immigration law should look like in the next century and, hence, this
puts us at a crossroads). Motomura, supra note 8, at 1629. Motomura suggests,
as does Judge Weinstein, that one path would be to apply mainstream constitu-
tional principles to immigration law. Motomura, supra note 8, at 1631. Further,
he suggests that immigration law has broader significance as a public law.
Motomura, supra note 8, at 1631. Specifically, he states that "[b]ecause how our
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proposes a future in which the judiciary and lawful permanent
residents can enjoy a fuller application of constitutional princi-
ples. 47 Despite the fact that these theories have been proposed by
scholars,141 they have not been embraced by the courts-until
now. Judge Weinstein, however, stands alone in suggesting that
aliens should be awarded additional rights under the Constitution.
No other district court to address the habeas corpus issue in the
deportation context has touched upon this topic. Nor did the Second
Circuit address this topic in Henderson v INS. 149 This is not
surprising, however, in light of the fact that the majority of these
courts have significantly curtailed aliens' rights under the statutory
habeas provision. Although the Mojica court's opinion represents
progressive thinking, it is unlikely that it will be embraced by the
judiciary or the legislature. 50
law treats outsiders puts in sharper relief much of how we treat ourselves,
immigration law offers a superb vantage point for mapping the contours of
mainstream public law." Motomura, supra note 8, at 1631.
147 See Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 142-51 (discussing the history of
immigration and the human rights obligations of the United States).
141 See Scaperlanda, supra note 122; Motomura, supra note 8.
14" 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998).
0 In 1993, the Washington Times reported that every year for that previous
decade most Americans polled in a national survey opposed more immigration
into the United States. See Samuel C. Francis, Suddenly Finding The Countly
Awash, WASH. TIMES, July 6, 1993, at El. The article further explained that
"Americans didn't dislike immigrants themselves and don't think they're bad or
inferior. They just know immigrants are not Americans and don't have the same
claims in the country as people who are. This land is our land, but it's not
necessarily everybody's land." Id. Similarly, a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll
conducted in 1993 found that 65% of those polled said that the United States
should admit fewer newcomers; 55% believed immigrant diversity threatened
American culture; and 64% said immigrants hurt the economy by lowering
wages. See Editorial, Beware of hnmigration Problems, USA TODAY, July 14,
1993, at 12A.
Americans are not alone. There has been a worldwide trend towards
enacting anti-immigration laws and tightening borders so as to prevent
immigration. Most notably, France enacted anti-immigration laws in 1993 that
allow police to conduct random identity checks of individuals and gave mayors
the right to block marriages between foreigners and French citizens. See William
Drozdiak, France's Tightened Immigration Laws Under Fire, WASH. POST, Aug.
8, 1993, at A28. England also passed similar laws in 1993. See Heather Mills,
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In the Mojica opinion, Judge Weinstein contends that lawful
permanent residents should be afforded substantive constitutional
rights as dictated by domestic and international law. Unfortunately,
however, the Mojica court's proposal comes at a time in history
when the United States is tightening its borders to prevent threats
that non-citizens pose to its security.'51 In this climate, it is
highly unlikely that Americans will be receptive to such a radical
change of course in immigration policy-even for lawful permanent
residents. 52
CONCLUSION
Mojica v. Reno stands alone in holding that section 2241 habeas
corpus power remains unaffected after the enactment of the 1996
immigration laws. Despite Congress' expressed intent to eliminate
immigrants' access to judicial review, Mojica adamantly refused to
Curbs on Asylum Seekers 'Already Too Tight, 'THE INDEPENDENT (London), Oct.
26, 1995, at 2. The Asylum and Immigration Act of 1993 which dramatically cut
the number of refugees seeking asylum. Id. Proposals were also raised in 1995
with the goal of "effectively wiping out asylum" in Great Britain. Id. Most
recently, Swiss voters narrowly rejected a referendum which would have
disqualified all illegal immigrants from refugee status and given the government
control over any wages earned by asylum-seekers. See Associated Press, Swiss
Voters Narrowly Reject Adding Anti-Immigration Clause to Constitution,
BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 2, 1996, at 10A.
' The legislative intent in passing the AEDPA and the IIRIRA was to
protect American citizens from the threat of foreign terrorists. See supra note 1
(describing the recent terrorist acts committed on American soil).
152 In the 1996 law journal note, The Rhetoric of Exclusion: The Art of
Drawing A Line Between Aliens and Citizens, Kiyoko Kamio Knapp wrote:
The public still perceives the growing presence of aliens as a threat.
... A Business Week/Harris poll suggests resentment against
immigrants is growing among the general public: sixty-eight percent
of respondents said that the influx of immigrants poses a threat to
America. One can observe, across the political spectrum, hostility
toward the rapidly growing population of foreign nationals. To
conservatives, the emergence of cultural pluralism will delete "Ameri-
can" public values. Liberals, on the other hand, fear tyrannical "tribal"
loyalties.
Knapp, supra note 8, at 414.
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close the federal courthouse doors to them. Instead, Mojica strictly
implemented the clear statement rule handed down by the Supreme
Court, thereby, declining to go beyond the plain meaning of the
AEDPA and the IIRIRA and into analysis rooted in Congressional
politics.'53
Accompanied by its passionate discussion of the history of
American immigration and international human rights, this decision
may yet persuade other jurisdictions to broadly interpret section
2241 and to follow its lead in moving immigration law beyond the
crossroads and into a future governed solely by constitutional law.
" See supra note 1 (explaining the incidents of terrorism that provoked the
enactment of AEDPA and JIRIRA). See also supra note 150 (describing anti-
immigration sentiments).
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